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Notes
The Applicability of Rule 11 Sanctions Upon
Removal from State to Federal Court:
Imposing a Continuing Obligation
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires an
attorney of record to sign every pleading or motion filed in a
case.1 The attorney's signature certifies that the attorney has
read the pleading, stipulates that it is well-grounded in fact,
and believes either that current law warrants it or permits an
argument for a good faith modification.2 Originally, Rule 11 re-
quired a showing of actual "willfulness" or bad faith on the
part of an attorney before the court imposed Rule 11 sanctions.3
Courts rarely enforced the rule, however, because they found it
difficult to establish that an attorney acted willfully or in bad
faith. Consequently, the lack of judicial action undermined
Rule l's expected deterrent effect.4
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1990); see also Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265
(2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987). The Oliveri court recognized
that the Rule repeatedly refers to the signing of papers, and the Rule's distinc-
tive feature is the certification established by the signature. 803 F.2d at 1274.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1990); see also Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of
New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985), modified on other grounds, 821 F.2d 121
(2d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987). In Eastway, the seminal case
discussing the 1983 amendment to Rule 11, the Second Circuit recognized that
the Supreme Court designed amended Rule 11 to "reduce the reluctance of
courts to impose sanctions... [while] emphasizing the responsibilities of the
attorney." 762 F.2d at 253 (emphasis in original).
3. The original Rule 11, promulgated in 1938, read as follows:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed
by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose ad-
dress shall be stated... The signature of an attorney constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading;, that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it;
and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is
signed with intent to defeat this purpose of the rule, it may be
stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the
pleading had not been served. For a willful violation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar
action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (1938).
4. Federal courts seldom used Rule 11's sanctions prior to 1983. See Oli-
phant, Rule 11 Sanctions and Standards: Blunting the Judicial Sword, 12 WM.
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Widespread concern over frivolous litigation and abusive
practices led to the Supreme Court's amendment of Rule 11 in
1983.5 The amendment incorporated an objective standard6
that imposes a duty on attorneys to certify that they have con-
MITCHELL L. REV. 731, 735 (1986). One study indicated that between 1938 and
1976, there were only 23 reported cases in which a party invoked former Rule
11 to strike a pleading, and only nine cases in which violations of Rule 11 were
found. Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement Some "Striking"
Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REv. 1, 34-35
(1976). According to the advisory committee notes to the 1983 amendment to
Rule 11, there was a great deal of confusion over the application of the prior
rule, the standards required of attorneys, and the availability of appropriate
sanctions. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.RD.
165, 198 (1983).
5. Amendments to the Federal Rules are promulgated by the Supreme
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 331 (Supp. 1982). Under this system, the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States serves as a standing "advisory committee"
to the Supreme Court. See J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1.02a[2]
(2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1988). The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court appoints
these advisory committees to formulate recommendations initially to the Judi-
cial Conference and then to the Supreme Court. See id. The Supreme Court
submits proposed rules to Congress, and these recommended rules become ef-
fective in 90 days, absent congressional action to repeal or amend them. Id.
The 1983 amendments were approved by the Supreme Court on April 28, 1983,
and became effective on August 1, 1983. See Amendments to Rules, 97 F.R.D.
165 (1983).
The amendment to Rule 11 in 1983 was part of an "integrated package" of
amendments to Rules 7, 11, 16, and 26. The Supreme Court designed these
changes -
to make lawyers more accountable for their actions, increase judicial
management of cases, improve the discovery process, and encourage
use of sanctions where appropriate. They focus on the pretrial pro-
cess and attempt to remedy the perceived inefficiencies and abuses of
the system by increasing judicial oversight of litigation and by dimin-
ishing the incentives for certain kinds of litigation behavior through
sanctions provisions.
Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 - Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo L.J.
1313, 1317 (1986).
Rule 7 was amended to make it clear that courts could impose sanctions in
motion practice. Oliphant, supra note 4, at 736. Rule 16 was amended to give
the judiciary greater control over filing as well as control over the negotiation
stage of a proceeding. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's
note. Rule 16(f) illustrates the nature of the control courts are expected to
wield. Oliphant, supra note 4, at 736. For example, it authorizes imposition of
sanctions for failing to participate in good faith in pretrial proceedings. Id.
Amended Rule 26 focuses on the problem of abusive discovery and provides
the judiciary with enlarged power to limit and control discovery. Id. Rule
26(g) provides for sanctions for abuse of the discovery process by imposing a
certification requirement similar to that under Rule 11 with respect to discov-
ery requests and responses. Id.; see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447
U.S. 752, 757 n.4 (1980).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1990).
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ducted a reasonable inquiry and have determined that any pa-
pers filed with the court are well-grounded in fact, legally
tenable, and not introduced for an improper purpose.7
The amended Rule 11, however, may not be as effective as
the amenders of Rule 11,8 courts,9 and commentators,10 first
7. See FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97
F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983). The courts have noted that the standard for testing
conduct is reasonableness under the circumstances. See Eavenson, Auchmuty
& Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 540 (3d Cir. 1985).
8. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97
F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983).
9. For a survey of recent cases discussing the standards for analyzing
Rule 11 claims, see Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990);
Schoenberger v. Oselka, 909 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1990); Dahnke v. Teamsters
Local 695, 906 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1990); Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d
40 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Associated Contractors, Inc., 877 F.2d 938
(11th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1133 (1990); In re Summers, 863 F.2d
20 (6th Cir. 1988); Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 861 F.2d 746 (1st Cir.
1988); Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1988); Flip Side
Prods., Inc. v. Jam Prods., Ltd., 843 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S.
909 (1988); Foval v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 841 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1988);
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988); Gaiardo v.
Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1987); Cannon v. Kroger Co., 832 F.2d 303
(4th Cir. 1987), rehg denied, 837 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Hurd v.
Ralphs Grocery Co., 824 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1987); Adduono v. World Hockey
Ass'n, 824 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1987); Hamer v. County of Lake, 819 F.2d 1362
(7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 146 (1989); Stiefvater Real Estate, Inc. v.
Hinsdale, 812 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1987); Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., 811
F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1987); Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight,
Inc., 809 F.2d 451 (7th Cir. 1987); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir.
1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987); Brown v. Capitol Air, Inc., 797 F.2d 106
(2d Cir. 1986); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (1985),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); Schmitz v. Campbell-Mithun, Inc., 124 F.R.D.
189 (N.D. IlM. 1989); Sauls v. Penn Virginia Resources Corp., 121 F.R.D. 657
(W.D. Va. 1988); Advo Sys., Inc. v. Walters, 110 F.R.D. 426 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
10. See, e.g., Dyer, A Genuine Ground in Summary Judgment for Rule 11,
99 YALE L.J. 411, 418-20 (1989); Nelken, supra note 5, at 1317-23; Oliphant,
supra note 4, at 736-40; Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1013,
1013-15 (1988) (hereinafter Schwarzer II]; Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the
New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 182-84 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Schwarzer I]; Untereiner, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97
YALE L.J. 901, 903-04 (1988); see also Note, Has a "Kaficaesque Dream" Come
True? Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11: Time for Another Amendment?, 67
B.U.L. REV. 1019, 1019-22 (1987); Note, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Duty to Withdraw a Baseless Pleading, 56 FORDHAM L.
REv. 697, 701-09 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Duty to Withdraw]; Note, Plausible
Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARv. L. REV.
630, 630-32 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Plausible Pleadings]; Note, Divining an
Approach to Attorney Sanctions and Iowa Rule 80(a) Through an Analysis of
Federal and State Civil Procedure Rules, 72 IowA L. REv. 701, 706-08 (1987)
[hereinafter Note, Divining an Approach]; Note, The Intended Application of
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thought. Rule 11 fails to address whether federal courts may
review pleadings originally filed in state court and subsequently
removed to federal court. Some interpretations of Rule 11 may
allow calculating plaintiffs to skirt the reach of Rule 11 and
still have their complaints tried in federal court, simply by fil-
ing a claim in state court that the plaintiff knows the defendant
likely will remove. The interpretation of Rule 11 that could
lead to such an occurrence is commonly known as the "one-
time obligation" theory. This theory posits that Rule 11 only
applies at the time of filing. Because the complaint in a re-
moval case originally is filed in state court and Federal Rule 11
does not apply to claims filed in state courts, the federal court
cannot apply Rule 11 to the complaint. Other courts, however,
allow a Rule 11 review on removal, employing a "continuing ob-
ligation" rule. These courts hold that Rule 11 imposes a "con-
tinuing obligation" on the plaintiff and plaintiff's attorney to
ensure that the complaint satisfies Rule 11, regardless of where
the complaint originally is filed.
This Note demonstrates that in removal cases, the plaintiff
and plaintiff's counsel should have a continuing Rule 11 obliga-
tion. Part I of this Note examines Rule 11 and its connection to
removal. Part II explores the desirability of imposing a contin-
uing obligation. Part III argues that the "continuing obligation"
theory should govern future removal questions under Rule 11.
Consequently, under the continuing obligation view, plaintiff,
plaintiff's attorney, and other future litigants would be wary of
filing a removable claim in state court to escape the reach of
Rule 11.11 In turn, a continuing obligation rule would bolster
Rule l's deterrent effect. Only through such a consistent ap-
proach will the courts accomplish the goal that the drafters of
the 1983 amendment envisioned - to deter the flow of frivo-
lous claims into federal court.1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11: An End to the "Empty Head, Pure Heart"
Defense and a Reinkforcement of Ethical Standards, 41 VAND. L. REV. 343, 352-
61 (1988).
11. Of course, a litigant may still file a claim under the continuing obliga-
tion view after weighing the costs and benefits of such a move against possible
sanctions. Discussion of types of sanctions and their effects are beyond the
scope of this Note.
12. FED. R. CiV. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D.
165, 198 (1983). In interpreting Rule 11, courts and commentators have created
a virtual quagmire in attempting to define the term "frivolous" claim. See
Schwarzer II, supra note 10, at 1015. The proper definition of the word "frivo-
lous" is, however, beyond the scope of this Note and irrelevant to the present
analysis. For purposes of this Note, a claim that violates any of the courts' def-
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I. THE HISTORY OF RULE 11 AND ITS CONNECTION
TO REMOVAL
A. THE 1983 AMENDMENT TO RULE 11
Faced with an increasing number of frivolous suits, dilatory
tactics, and an ineffective Rule 11 with which to combat such
measures, the Supreme Court amended Rule 11 in 1983.1
3
Amended Rule 11 attacks litigation abuse by increasing the sig-
initions of "frivolous" is considered baseless and potentially subject to sanc-
tions. This Note addresses the issue of whether an attorney has a one-time or
continuing obligation to monitor these potentially baseless pleadings upon re-
moval of a case from state to federal court.
13. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, as amended, provides:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attor-
ney's individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is
not represented by an attorney shall sign the party's pleading, motion,
or other paper and state the party's address. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified
or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of
an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two wit-
nesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is
abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certifi-
cate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or
other paper, that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact
and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the ex-
tension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not in-
terposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken un-
less it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention
of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable ex-
penses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other
paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1990).
The original Rule 11 had been adopted in 1938 as part of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Order Adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 308 U.S. 649, 676 (1939) (order dated Dec. 20, 1937). The rule at-
tempted to deter frivolous claims, see FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's
note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983), and Carter, The History and Pur-
poses of Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 4, 4 (1985), by requiring an attorney to
certify that to the "best of [the attorney's] knowledge, information, and belief
there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay." See
supra note 3; see also Schwarzer I, supra note 10, at 183. Under the original
Rule 11, an attorney seeking to avoid the imposition of sanctions had to estab-
lish only a subjective good faith belief that the complaint was well-supported
in both fact and law. Attorneys easily could establish this "subjective" belief,
and consequently, courts were unwilling to impose penalties. See, e.g., Smith
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nificance of the lawyer's signature on pleadings, motions, and
other papers.-4 Specifically, as amended, Rule 11 contains the
following changes: Rule 11 applies to every paper filed in court,
not just the pleadings; 15 mandates a reasonable pre-filing in-
quiry;16 specifies that papers filed must be well-grounded in
fact and based on existing law or on a good faith argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;17 pro-
v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers, 829 F.2d 1370, 1379 (6th Cir. 1987); Nemeroff v.
Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980), qff'd, 704 F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 1983).
The original Rule, however, did not effectively deter abuses of the litiga-
tion process; the amended Rule 11 requires an objective pre-trial examination.
This enables courts to dispose of cases at an earlier stage, thereby fostering ju-
dicial economy and minimizing frivolous claims. See FED. R CIv. P. ii advi-
sory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983); see also Eastway
Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985), cert de-
nied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987). The extent to which judges were reluctant to impose
sanctions prior to the 1983 amendments is evidenced by the fact that between
1938 and 1976, Rule 11 motions had been filed in only 19 reported cases. S.
KAsSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 2 (Fed. Jud. Center
1985). Among these cases, violations were found in only 11 instances, and at-
torneys sanctioned in only three. 1d.
14. See Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 10, at 632. Amended Rule
11 is designed to make the federal courts operate more efficiently by curbing
the expense and court delays that litigating frivolous claims creates. See Note,
Duty to Withdraw, supra note 10, at 702. As the advisory committee note
states, the amended rule "should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and
help... streamline the litigation process." FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory commit-
tee's note, reprinted in 97 F.ID. 165, 198 (1983).
The original Rule 11 was utilized rarely because striking a pleading was
an ineffective penalty. See Schwarzer I, supra note 10, at 181. Occasionally,
the courts imposed sanctions or dismissal, but confusion among the courts con-
cerning the application of the rule minimized the application of such sanctions.
'CL
15. See Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The
Banov court noted that a district court could sanction an attorney for any "spe-
cifkwally identified pleading, motion, or other paper" submitted during the
cause of action. Id. at 45 (emphasis in original).
16. The Advisory Committee noted that the new language emphasizes the
need for some pre-filing inquiry into both the facts and the law to satisfy the
affirmative duty that the Rule imposes. FED R.. CIv. P. 11 advisory commit-
tee's note, reprinted in 97 F.RD. 165, 198-99 (1983).
17. This standard is one of reasonableness under the circumstances, which
is more stringent than the original good-faith formula. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advi-
sory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198-99 (1983). The court
may consider the circumstances of a case before imposing sanctions. These
factors may include how much time was available for investigation; whether
the signer had to rely on a client for information as to the facts underlying the
pleading, motion, or other paper, whether the pleading was based on a reason-
able interpretation of the law; or whether the signer depended on information
provided by a forwarding counsel or another member of the bar. Id.; see also
Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 540 (3d Cir.
1985). However, the rule does not permit the use of the "pure heart and
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hibits papers interposed for any improper purpose;' 8 and directs
empty head" defense. Schwarzer I, supra note 10, at 187. Instead, the rule im-
poses an obligation on the attorney analogous to the railroad crossing sign,
"Stop, Look, and Listen." It may be rephrased, "Stop, Think, Investigate, and
Research" for an attorney filing suit in federal court. Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp.,
835 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1987). An attorney may not evade the duty to make a
reasonable inquiry into the facts and law by claiming that duty to the client
comes first. Advo Sys., Inc. v. Walters, 110 F.R.D. 426, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1986);
see also Pawlowske v. Chrysler Corp., 623 F. Supp. 569, 573 (N.D. 11M. 1985),
qff'd, 799 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1987). The Pawowske court held that creativity
by itself is not enough. The creativity must be in service of a good faith appli-
cation of the law or at least a good faith request for a change in the law. 623 F.
Supp. at 573. However, distortion of the law or of a statute is precisely the sort
of creativity Rule 11 should chill. Id.
Consequently, the amendment will trigger more violations of the Rule.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 199
(1983); see also Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1221 (6th Cir. 1986). One
commentator discussed the nature of purposes of such sanctions. The com-
mentator noted that:
a key distinction must be maintained between the purpose of Rule 11
and the purpose(s) of any particular sanction imposed under the Rule.
The purpose of Rule 11 itself would seem to be general deterrence:
The Rule's existence serves as a general threat to discourage lawyers
and litigants from engaging in prohibited conduct. On the other hand,
the purpose of any particular sanction is primarily specific deterrence.
A sanction is actually imposed only when general deterrence (via the
threat of sanctions) has failed.
Choosing the most severe sanction in each case would discourage
or "chill" legitimate lawsuits and valid litigation techniques. In addi-
tion, massive sanctions could, in an individual case, go well beyond the
needs of specific deterrence. What is needed, then, is a more uniform
approach to imposing and calculating individual sanctions - one that
takes into account the differential need to specifically deter - so that
the general deterrent aim is achieved without overdeterrence. Spe-
cific deterrence should be the guiding principle in the imposition of
individual Rule 11 sanctions.
Untereiner, supra note 10, at 908-09.
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1990); see also Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d
1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Westrnoreland court emphasized that Rule 11
was promulgated to deter the flow of frivolous claims into federal court. 770
F.2d at 1274. In addition, the type of sanction to be imposed lies within the
discretion of the district court. Id. at 1275. However, when it is patently clear
that a claim has absolutely no chance of success under the existing precedents,
and where no reasonable argument can be made for the extension of existing
law, Rule 11 has been violated. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York,
762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987). Such an inter-
pretation punishes those who manipulate the federal court system "for ends
inimicable to those for which it was created." Id.
In contrast, the only improper purpose for conducting litigation acknowl-
edged by the original Rule was delay. '"Te Rule failed to recognize that litiga-
tion can be conducted for other improper purposes, such as to mislead the
court, to harass an opponent, to impose defense costs, or to pressure an oppo-
nent into a settlement." See Note, Duty to Withdraw, supra note 10, at 701.
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the courts to impose sanctions upon its violation.19
Amended Rule 11 has proved somewhat effective. Federal
courts increasingly have imposed Rule 11 sanctions for frivo-
lous filings.20 Nevertheless, despite the increasing number of
court decisions and scholarly works exploring and explaining
the scope of Rule 11, the appropriate application of Rule 11 in
the removal context has received relatively little attention.
B. REMOVAL OF CASES FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURT
Interpreting Rule 11 to impose either a one-time or contin-
uing obligation on the plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel is critical
in determining whether a federal court can sanction them for
Rule 11 violations based solely on state court pleadings once a
case is removed to federal court.2 1 Clearly, the defendant's mo-
tion for removal is subject to Rule 11:22 The Judicial Improve-
19. The new Rule mandates the imposition of sanctions when a violation
is found. See INVST Financial Group, Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d
391, 401 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 291 (1987); see also Kale v. Combined
Ins. Co. of America, 861 F.2d 746, 757 (1st Cir. 1988) (the "shall impose" lan-
guage of the new Rule mandates the imposition of sanctions whenever an ob-
jective violation of its tenets is found). Although courts retain discretion to
determine the type and amount of the sanction, see Note, Duty to Withdraw,
supra note 10, at 704, the mandatory nature of such sanctions encourages their
use. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F!RD.
165, 198-99 (1983).
20. In the first two years under the new Rule 11, district courts reported
233 cases in which sanctions were considered. See Nelken, supra note 5, at
1326. As of July 1, 1987, there had been 564 reported Rule 11 decisions in the
district courts and courts of appeals. See Vairo, Report to the Advisory Com-
mittee on Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5 (unpub-
lished, Sept. 1987) (cited in Schwarzer II, supra note 10, at 1013 n.2). However,
other commentators have suggested that Rule 11 has preduced over 1000 cases
in its first five years of operation. See Untereiner, supra note 10, at 901; Jo-
seph, The Trouble with Rule 11, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1987, at 87, 88. The discrep-
ancy between some of these estimates may be due to the fact that publishing
an opinion is one form of sanctions, and, consequently, some cases in which
the sanctions arose may not have been published. See Chrein, The Actual Op-
eration of Amended Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 13,16 (1985).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (Supp. 1990). In general, cases that involve a federal
question or one in which the district court would have original jurisdictions
are removable. In addition, cases involving diversity of citizenship between all
parties may be removed. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(c) (Supp. 1990).
22. The statute on removal provides:
A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action or
criminal prosecution from a State court shall file in the district court
... a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain statement
of the grounds for removal.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (Supp. 1990).
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ments and Access to Justice Act of 1 98823 provides that,
pursuant to Rule 11, the defense attorney must sign the notice
of removal.2 Whether the federal court may impose any simi-
lar type of Rule 11 requirement to verify the merits of the orig-
inal state court pleadings upon removal, however, remains
unresolved.
The United States circuit courts of appeals are split over
whether a defendant can mount a Rule 11 challenge to a plain-
tiff's state court pleadings once a case is removed to federal dis-
trict court, thereby forcing a plaintiff to verify that the
pleadings represent a reasonable belief in the validity of a
claim.25 The courts' debate centers around discussion of the
23. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988).
24. The commentary on the 1988 Revision to the removal statute provided
that:
The requirement that a verified petition be part of the removal papers
was eliminated and in its place is a "notice of removal signed pursuant
to Rule 11." Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule
that authorizes sanctions for a paper whose averments are not "well
grounded in fact and... warranted by... law," would apply by its
own terms; the reference to it is included to resolve all doubt. The
sanctions authorized by the controversial Rule 11 were deemed an ad-
equate substitute for a false statement in a verified petition.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (Supp. 1990). This amendment was part of the Judicial Im-
provements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat.
4642 (1988). Subdivisions (a) and (b) were amended, old subdivision (d), which
required a bond with good and sufficient surety, deleted, and old subdivisions
(e) and (f) relettered (d) and (e). IMi
Under the statutes, the removing defendant must satisfy both the substan-
tive requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 governing the types of removable cases,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (Supp. 1990), and the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446. In general, cases that involve a federal question or one in which the
district court would have original jurisdictions are removable. In addition,
cases involving diversity of citizenship between all parties may be removed. 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(c) (Supp. 1990). After the substantive requirements are met,
a defendant must meet the procedure of removal as described at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446 (1990). This section provides in part:
[a] defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action or
criminal prosecution from a State court shall file in the district court
of the United States for the district and division within which such ac-
tion is pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain
statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all pro-
cess, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants
in such action.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (Supp. 1990). In summary, if the case is removable under
§ 1446, the defendant must sign a notice of removal pursuant to § 1441.
25. Courts and commentators have divided on this issue. Compare Herron
v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332, 335-36 (6th Cir. 1988); Note, Duty to With-
draw, supra note 10, at 716-17 (both advocating continuing duty) with Corpora-
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one-time versus continuing obligation theories, and only a reso-
lution of this debate will enable courts to fashion a consistent
approach to Rule 11 sanctions in removal cases.
1. One-Time Obligation
The one-time obligation theory has generated substantial
support from the United States circuit courts of appeal. At
least eight circuits, including the District of Columbia, Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh,26 follow
the one-time obligation interpretation of Rule 11.27 In addition,
the Eighth and Tenth Circuits2s apparently support the one-
time obligation position, although these circuits may not have
adopted such a circuit-wide rule.
The courts backing the one-time obligation theory in the
case of removal2 focus on the time of signing the pleadings and
the plain language of the rule.3 0 These courts observe that
tion of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Associated Contractors, Inc., 877 F.2d 938, 943 (11th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1133 (1990); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866,
874 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir.
1987); Oliveri v. Thompson, 808 F.2d 1265, 1274-75 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied,
480 U.S. 918 (1987) (all opposing continuing duty).
26. See, e.g., Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40, 44-45 (D.C. Cir.
1990); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Associated Contractors, Inc., 877 F.2d 938, 942-43 (11th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1133 (1990); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs.,
836 F.2d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc); United Energy Owners Comm-, Inc.
v. United Energy Management Sys., Inc., 837 F.2d 356, 364-65 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Rule 11 applies only to litigation misconduct involving signing of paper);
Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987); Kirby v. Allegheny
Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 1987); Hamer v. County of Lake,
819 F.2d 1362, 1370 n.15 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 146 (1989);
Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
918 (1987).
27. Id
28. See Adduono v. World Hockey Ass'n, 824 F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1987)
("Rule 11 is not a panacea intended to remedy all manner of attorney miscon-
duct occurring before or during the trial of civil cases."); cJf Conklin v. United
States, 812 F.2d 1318, 1319 (10th Cir. 1987) (reversing without discussing sanc-
tions based in part on the continuation of litigation).
29. A number of circuits have construed Rule 11 not to apply to com-
plaints filed in state court that are subsequently removed to federal court. See,
e.g., Hurd v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 824 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1987); Stiefvater Real
Estate, Inc. v. Hinsdale, 812 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1987); Kirby v. Allegheny Bever-
age Corp., 811 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1987); Brown v. Capitol Air, Inc., 797 F.2d 106
(2d Cir. 1986).
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1990). In support of this position, the Second Cir-
cuit emphasized that the advisory committee's note to the amended rule states
that the signer's conduct is to be judged as of the time the pleading or other
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Rule ll's emphasis on the need to perform a "reasonable in-
quiry" before signing a pleading, motion, or other paper3' sug-
gests that the rule authorizes sanctions for inadequate pre-
filing inquiries only at the time the papers are filed.
For example, the Seventh Circuit adopted the one-time ob-
ligation theory in Dahnke v. Teamsters Local 695,32 finding that
a Rule 11 challenge may be based only on inadequate inquiry as
of the time the pleadings, or other papers, are filed. 33 Conse-
quently, a litigant, if challenged, merely has an obligation to
verify the merits of a claim or motion once - at the time of
filing - and a Rule 11 violation cannot be made with respect to
a previously filed paper.34 Further, the Dahnke court noted
that Rule 11, a federal court rule, does not apply to pleadings or
any other paper originally filed in state court or a state admin-
istrative agency.35 Reading the rules together, the Seventh Cir-
cuit found that Rule 11 does not apply at the time the pleadings
are filed in the state agency, and, therefore, the court could not
impose sanctions unless it could identify a frivolous federal
court pleading.36
paper is signed. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986), cert
denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987). The Oliveri court found it difficult to imagine why
this comment would be made if the rule were meant to impose a continuing
obligation on the attorney. Id,
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1990); see supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
32. 906 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1990). Dahnke involved an employee who was
fired after he accrued the requisite number of points under the company's no-
fault absentee program. Id. at 1194. The employee brought suit against the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, alleging that the employer had
discharged him without just cause. Id. The Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiff could not pursue the breach of contract claim against the employer
after the determination that the union did not wrongfully refuse to process his
grievance. Id, at 1197. However, the court determined that Rule 11 sanctions
should not have been imposed upon plaintiff and his attorney for the period
prior to the date that the attorney filed documents in district court. Id at
1201.
33. Id. at 1199 (stating that parties merely must conduct a pre-filing
inquiry).
34. Id. at 1200-01. The Dahnke court held that a federal court cannot
sanction an attorney for conduct that occurred solely in state court or a state
administrative proceeding. Id at 1199. For a vivid description of this require-
ment, see Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 1988)
(en banc) ("Like a snapshot, Rule 11 review focuses upon the instant when the
picture is taken - when the signature is placed on the document.").
35. Dahnke, 906 F.2d at 1199-1200 (emphasizing that federal courts cannot
reach back to a state court filing to impose sanctions).
36. Id. at 1200. Because Dahnke and his attorney filed their claim with
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, sanctions must be imposed
based on state sanction rules, not federal rules. The court held that Rule 11
sanctions could not be imposed from the time of removal until the party first
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Other circuits have reached the same result.3" The Second
Circuit agreed with Dahnke, noting that amended Rule 11 does
not provide for retrospective application.38 The District of Co-
lumbia Circuit emphasized that requiring only a one-time pre-
filing inquiry under Rule 11 is consistent with an attorney's
professional responsibility obligations.39 Under prevailing pro-
fessional responsibility standards, an attorney has broad discre-
tion in determining whether to initiate representation of a
client and in taking particular steps once litigation has begun.40
The court reasoned that requiring only a pre-filing inquiry
would adequately preserve the federal courts' interest in con-
trolling abusive litigation while preserving the attorney's free-
dom to present a case.41
The one-time obligation courts also emphasize that other
statutory and procedural provisions can fill any gaps in fighting
files in federal court. Id, at 1201. The Seventh Circuit continues to adhere to
this view. See Schoenberger v. Oselka, 909 F.2d 1086, 1088 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that because Rule 11 did not govern the plaintiff's complaint when
filed, the signing of the complaint could not have violated Rule 11).
37. See, e.g., Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987) (Rule
11 sanctions are improper "in situations which do not involve signing a pa-
per"); Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253, 256-57 (4th Cir. 1987)
(emphasizing that Rule 11-only addresses the moment of signing the pleading);
Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 480 U.S.
918 (1987) (Rule 11 deals exclusively with "the certification flowing from the
signature to a pleading, motion, or other paper in a lawsuit"). District courts
also have followed this interpretation. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F.
Supp. 1162, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
38. See Stiefvater Real Estate, Inc. v. Hinsdale, 812 F.2d 805, 809 (2d Cir.
1987). For other courts that have echoed this view, see Hurd v. Ralphs Gro-
cery Co., 824 F.2d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 1987) (courts cannot impose sanctions for
filings in state court); Brown v. Capitol Air, Inc., 797 F.2d 106, 108 (2d Cir.
1987) (same); Columbus, Cuneo, Cabrini Medical Center v. Holiday Inn, 111
F.R.D. 444, 447 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (imposing sanctions in a diversity case based on
a state court complaint and a motion for voluntary dismissal "would be analo-
gous to applying an ex post facto law").
39. Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40, 44-45 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
40. Id. at 45; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC
2-26 (1990) (giving a lawyer wide discretion in determining whether to repre-
sent a client); MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.2(a) (1990)
(providing what permissible steps an attorney may take once litigation has
begun).
41. Banov, 899 F.2d at 45. The court noted that if the attorney should
have known that the case was without merit when commenced, sanctions can
be imposed by virtue of continuing the suit. The court deemed this an ade-
quate protection of a federal court's interest in minimizing abusive claims. Id
If the attorney should have known that a client's cause of action was without
merit when the action commenced, the attorney is responsible for expenses in-
curred by virtue of continuing representation. Id. The Banov court empha-
sized that it is because an attorney may be held liable for expenses caused by
1742 [Vol. 75:1731
frivolous filings that the one-time interpretation of Rule 11 cre-
ates. For example, federal courts could use their "inherent
powers"42 to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party when the losing party acted in bad faith or for purposes
of harassment.43 Alternatively, the courts could hold an attor-
an unreasonable filing that the court need not determine whether the continu-
ing representation influenced the size of the fee award. Id. at 45 n.8.
Nevertheless, the Banov court did not explicitly rule out the possibility of
an ongoing obligation. In the Banov case, the district court imposed a $5000
sanction on Banov under Rule 11 after entering summary judgment for the de-
fendant. Id. at 41. In defining the basis for these sanctions, however, the court
found both that Banov failed to conduct a pre-filing inquiry and that he unrea-
sonably continued the suit after learning that the suit was without merit. Id.
The Banov court did not rely on the district court's second finding - that Ba-
nov unreasonably continued the case - because Banov did not raise or brief
the issue of whether Rule 11 imposes a continuing obligation. Id. at 44. The
court noted that Banov's failure to conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry was
enough to impose sanctions. Once the district court made this determination,
Banov's post-filing conduct became immaterial. Id. However, the court indi-
cated in dicta that it felt constrained to follow the weight of authority support-
ing the one-time obligation position. Id at 45. The court recognized, however,
that unfettered attorney discretion regarding trial tactics could inhibit the
court's interest and potentially violate professional responsibility rules. Id.
The Rules of Professional Conduct do not allow an attorney total freedom to
withdraw from representing a client or to settle a case against a client's
wishes. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.2(a), 1.16(b)-(c)
(1983).
42. The term "inherent power" lacks a precise definition, but the
Supreme Court once defined the term as the power "necessary to the exercise
of all others" and "not immediately derived from statute." United States v.
Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
43. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980). The "in-
herent power" of the court is a general exception to the American Rule, which
does not allow the prevailing party to recover its attorney fees. See F.D. Rich
Co., Inc. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974). The court may make
awards under the inherent power exception against the losing party or against
the attorney for the losing party. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Pac. Ltd. v. Rascator
Maritime S.A., 782 F.2d 329, 344 (2d Cir. 1986) (award made against party);
Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1982) (award made against
attorney), cert denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983). In addition, the inherent power of
a court necessarily includes the authority to impose reasonable and appropri-
ate sanctions upon lawyers who act inappropriately. Kleiner v. First Nat'l
Bank, 751 F.2d 1193, 1209 (11th Cir. 1985). However, the inherent power of the
court may not be invoked in the case of a settlement agreement that has not
been submitted to the court. See Adduono v. World Hockey Ass'n, 824 F.2d
617, 622 (8th Cir. 1987).
This bad-faith exception permitting an award of attorney's fees is not re-
stricted to cases where the action is filed in bad faith. The court may impose
an inherent power award either for commencing or for continuing an action in
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. See Oliveri v.
Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1,
15 (1973) (" '[B]ad faith' may be found, not only in the actions that led to the
lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation."). Nevertheless, many cir-
1991] RULE 11 1743
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ney liable for multiplying proceedings "unreasonably and vexa-
tiously" under section 1927 of Title 28.44
To further support the idea that Rule 11 only relates to the
time the initial pleading is signed, some one-time obligation
cults have interpreted this standard restrictively, thereby minimizing its prac-
tical effect. The Second Circuit, for example, has declined to uphold awards
under the bad-faith exception absent both clear evidence that the actions have
no basis as well as a high degree of specificity in the factual findings of the
district court. See Dow Chem. Pac. Ltd, 782 F.2d at 344.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988). This section provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court
of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be re-
quired by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses,
and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
Id.
Unlike Rule 11, however, § 1927 applies only when the attorney acts in
subjective bad faith. Thus, while § 1927 authorizes sanctions when an attorney
acts in bad faith to continue nonmeritorious litigation, see Fritz v. Honda Mo-
tor Co., Ltd., 818 F.2d 924, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam), § 1927 presumably
would not authorize sanctions against an attorney who merely accedes to his
client's wishes to continue a nonmeritorious claim. Cf. Oliveri, 803 F.2d at
1276-79 (no sanctions under § 1927 for continuation of nonmeritorious civil
rights claim).
For many years, § 1927 imposed a burden only for excess costs and ex-
penses, which only rarely involved significant sums. As a result, the statute
has generated very little litigation. See Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1273; Roadway Ex-
press, Inc., 447 U.S. at 759-64.
When Congress amended § 1927 in 1980 to include attorney fees among
the category of expenses that a court might require an attorney to satisfy per-
sonally, it made clear that the purpose of the statute was to deter unnecessary
delays in litigation. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1234, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, re-
printed in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 2716, 2782; see Cheng v.
GAF Corp., 713 F.2d 886, 890 (2d Cir. 1983).
Like an award made pursuant to the court's inherent power, an award
under § 1927 usually has required a showing of bad faith. Oliveri, 803 F.2d at
1273. Although precedents have not always made this bad-faith requirement
clear, see Cheng, 713 F.2d at 891 n.3, courts usually have been unwilling to im-
pose sanctions without a showing of bad faith. See Dahnke v. Teamsters Local
695, 906 F.2d 1192, 1201 n.6 (7th Cir. 1990); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc.,
836 F.2d 866, 870 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988); Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1273; Alyeska Pipeline
Servs. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975).
In fact, some recent courts have interpreted this statute as also imposing
an objective standard. In Theng, 713 F.2d at 891 n.3, the court stated that it
need not decide whether an award under § 1927 requires a finding of bad faith
or merely "unreasonable conduct." In the 1990 bankruptcy case of In re En-
drex Inv., Inc., 111 Bankr. 939, 947 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990), the court said that
"[i]t is now well-established that the standard for the award of sanctions under
§ 1927 is an objective, not a subjective one." A case from the Tenth Circuit
also indicated that fees are imposable against an attorney "for conduct that,
viewed objectively, manifests intentional or reckless disregard of the attor-
ney's duties to the court." Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1512 (10th Cir.
1987).
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courts point to the goals of enhancing judicial economy and
protecting plaintiffs from harassment. These objectives are un-
dermined if defendants remove cases to federal court merely to
obtain sanctions on the plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel, rather
than for any legitimate preference that a federal court hear the
claim.45 Further, if the plaintiff brings two or more claims in
state court but the defendant removes only one of those claims
to federal court and then seeks sanctions based on that one
claim,4 6 the removal essentially bifurcates litigation that should
be resolved in a single proceeding.47 Because Rule 11 is
designed to effectuate the economic use of judicial resources,
courts recognize that defendants should not be rewarded for
creating an unnecessary second suit.46 Thus, in order to achieve
the primary goal of the drafters of Rule l1's 1983 amendment
- decreasing frivolous claims in federal court - the one-time
obligation courts assert that state court pleadings should be im-
mune from Rule 11 review.49
2. Continuing Obligation
A few circuit courts of appeals focus on Rule l's purpose
of preventing litigation abuse. These courts, including the First
and Sixth Circuits, °O conclude that an attorney and litigant
have a continuing obligation throughout the entire course of lit-
45. See, e.g., Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253 (4th Cir.
1987). The Kirby court emphasized that many states either lack a comparable
rule or impose a much less stringent standard than Rule 11. Id at 257. The
court believed that the lenient state standards, combined with the opportuni-
ties for sanctions under Rule 11, would cause defendants to remove more cases
to federal court to obtain the benefits of the rule. Id. This, in turn, could in-
crease the number of frivolous claims in federal court, a result contrary to the
purposes behind Rule 11. Id.
46. See, e.g., Brown v. Capitol Air, Inc., 797 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1986). In that
case, a passenger brought a state court action against an airline, alleging vari-
ous causes of action arising out of forcible expulsion from the flight. Id. at 107.
A second complaint alleged libel, slander, and various tort theories. Id The
defendant removed the second cause of action to federal court but left the first
claim in state court. Id at 108.
47. Id- at 108. The second cause of action only added slight variations on
legal themes already pending in the state court, and therefore, when consoli-
dated with the first claim, would not have taken much more additional time to
litigate in state court. Id In contrast, the removal of the single issue added
costs for the federal courts as well as both parties. Id
48. See id The court recognized that the defendant had effectively raised
costs for everyone involved in the trial. Therefore, imposing sanctions on the
plaintiff would not serve Rule 11's purpose. Id
49. See, e.g., Kirby, 811 F.2d at 257.
50. Kale v. Combined Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 746 (1st Cir. 1988); Herron v. Jupi-
ter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1988).
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igation to review and reevaluate their pleadings, motions, and
other papers.51 Under this theory, if at any time the attorney
or the client discovers that such papers are without merit, they
must immediately dismiss the action or risk Rule 11
sanctions.52
This continuing obligation also governs removal cases.
Under this theory, it makes no difference that the pleading or
paper was originally filed in state court where Rule 11 does not
apply. Once a case is removed to federal court, Rule 11 begins
to apply, and the plaintiff has a continuing responsibility to re-
view and reevaluate the pleadings and, where appropriate, to
modify them to conform to Rule 11.53 The Sixth Circuit is the
leading proponent of this interpretation. In Herron v. Jupiter
Transp. Co. ,54 the defendant removed a state action to federal
court and made a motion to dismiss.5 5 The complaint contained
factual inaccuracies and was unwarranted by existing law; due
to these deficiencies and plaintiffs' failure to respond to the
court order to dismiss the action, the federal district court
judge imposed Rule 11 sanctions.5 The Sixth Circuit affirmed,
stating that, in a removal case, Rule 11 imposes a continuing ob-
ligation on plaintiffs to monitor the pleadings.5 7 In holding that
51. Herron, 858 F.2d at 336 (arguing that attorneys must constantly
reevaluate their pleadings throughout the trial); see also Advo Sys., Inc. v.
Walters, 110 F.R.D. 426, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (Rule 11 imposes an ongoing
duty on attorneys to refrain from pursuing baseless litigation at any stage).
52. See Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 844 F.2d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1988) (failure
to dismiss a claim once discovery disclosed that the claims were specious war-
ranted sanctions for attorney fees incurred by defendant to pursue summary
dismissal of the action); Flip Side Prods., Inc. v. Jam Prods., Ltd., 843 F.2d
1024, 1036 (7th Cir.) (upheld sanctions, under Rule 11's frivolousness clause,
because once discovery was completed, plaintiff should have known that the
facts and the law clearly established that the complaint was baseless), cert de-
nied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988). In Flip Side, the plaintiff's failure to dismiss the
case upon discovering no basis for the claim provided justification for imposing
sanctions. Id at 1036-37; see also Schmitz v. Campbell-Mithun, Inc., 124 F.R.D.
189, 193 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (Rule 11 can punish parties for filing papers in federal
district court for an improper purpose, or that lack an adequate factual or
legal basis).
53. Herron, 858 F.2d at 335-36.
54. 858 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1988).
55. Because the plaintiffs' action involved § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988), removal was proper. Herron, 858 F.2d at
333. Once removed, the defendant noted that the complaint was baseless and
sought to dismiss the action. Id
56. The district court confirmed that plaintiffs' complaint was grounded
neither on fact nor law and imposed sanctions. Herron, 858 F.2d at 334.
57. 1& at 335-36. The plaintiffs contended that the district court was with-
out jurisdiction to impose sanctions under Federal Rule 11 because the action
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Rule 11 applies immediately upon removal, the Herron court
derived support from Rule 81(c),-s which dictates that federal
rules apply to all proceedings after a case is removed from state
court.5 9 Because Rule 11 applies immediately upon removal,
the district court may impose sanctions if the plaintiff fails to
conform the pleadings to federal standards.60 Furthermore, the
Herron court reasoned that the Rule 11 "reasonable inquiry"
standard must be met throughout the litigation in order to ac-
complish Rule 11's goal of minimizing frivolous suits in federal
court.6 ' Thus, once a case is removed, federal rules apply, and
the plaintiff continually must conform the pleadings to the re-
quirements of the federal rules.62
3. Compromise Theory
In order to resolve the dilemma that the one-time versus
was filed in state court and later removed. Id- at 334. Instead, they claimed
that Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 11 should govern, a rule that imposes
merely a subjective test. Id. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, stating that, in a re-
moval case, the plaintiff is impressed with a continuing obligation to reevalu-
ate the pleadings to make them conform to federal rules. Id. at 335-36.
58. Rule 81(c) governs the procedure after removal, and the rule provides,
in relevant part:
(c) Removed Actions. These rules apply to civil actions removed to
the United States district courts from the state courts and govern pro-
cedure after removal. Repleading is not necessary unless the court so
orders. In a removed action in which the defendant has not answered,
the defendant shall answer or present the other defenses or objec-
tions available under these rules within 20 days after the receipt
through service or otherwise of a copy of the initial pleading setting
forth the claim for relief upon which the action or proceeding is
based, or within 20 days after the service of summons upon such ini-
tial pleading, then filed, or within 5 days after the filing of the peti-
tion for removal, whichever period is longest. If at the time of
removal all necessary pleadings have been served, a party entitled to
trial by jury under Rule 38 shall be accorded it, if the party's demand
therefor is served within 10 days after service on the party of the no-
tice of filing the petition.
FED. R. Crv. P. 81(c).
59. Herron, 858 F.2d at 335. See generally Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965) (discussing the power of the Supreme Court to prescribe Rules for gov-
erning practice and procedure for all federal court proceedings).
60. See Herron, 858 F.2d at 336.
61. Id. at 335-36. The court stated that any other interpretation would
"undercut the full force intended by Rule 11." Id. at 336.
62. IM. The court believed that if a reasonably diligent inquiry would have
disclosed the claim to be without merit, the action should not be continued.
The court reasoned that Rule 11 was promulgated to deter the flow of frivo-
lous claims into federal court. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory commit-
tee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 200 (1983); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.,
770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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continuing obligation controversy poses, one panel of the Fifth
Circuit offered a potential compromise theory.ra Although it
purported to uphold the one-time obligation position that a pre-
vious Fifth Circuit panel had adopted,64 this court hinted at a
compromise theory for removal cases.6s Under this theory, the
court stated that, upon removal of an action to federal court, a
plaintiff is not subject to immediate sanctions for pleadings
filed in state court that violate federal Rule 11.66 Rather, if de-
ficiencies in the pleadings are brought to the plaintiff's atten-
tion when the case is removed, the plaintiff's attorney must
either modify them to conform with Rule 11 or risk Rule 11
sanctions.6 7 Nevertheless, a more definite resolution of the de-
bate is needed to guide federal courts toward a consistent appli-
cation of Rule 11 upon removal from state to federal court6a
63. See Foval v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 841 F.2d 126, 130 (5th Cir.
1988). In Foval, a holder of a note given in exchange for the sale of the com-
pany brought a RICO action against the promisor and bank that had approved
the purchase agreement. The case was removed to federal court, and even
though the removal may have been improper, the federal court was allowed to
decide the case because the plaintiff welcomed the return to the federal fo-
rum. Id. at 127-29.
64. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
banc). In that case, the court adopted a five-step analysis. First, Rule 11 issues
are reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. Id at 871-73.
Second, Rule 11 imposes certain obligations on litigants and attorneys. Id at
873-76. Third, a district court must impose sanctions once it finds a Rule 11
violation, but the court retains significant discretion to tailor "appropriate"
sanctions to the facts of a particular case. Id at 876-79. Fourth, a party seek-
ing sanctions must promptly notify the court and the offending party of the
potential Rule 11 violation. Id at 879-81. Fifth, a district court need not sup-
port its Rule 11 decision with specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in
all cases, but if the justification underlying the decision is not readily appar-
ent, a prompt remand for such conclusions will be made. Id- at 882-83.
65. The Foval court appeared to adopt the one-time obligation position of
the Fifth Circuit when it observed that "Rule 11 should not countenance sanc-
tions for pleadings filed in state court in a case later removed to federal court."
Foval, 841 F.2d at 130. However, the court recognized the potential for impos-
ing such sanctions when it added, "unless, their deficiency having been
promptly brought to the attention of the pleader after removal, he (or she) re-
fuses to modify them to conform to Rule 11. Id The Herron court explicitly
recognized the continuing obligation theory and stated that the litigant and
the litigant's attorney are under a continuing obligation to examine the basis
for their claim in order to satisfy Rule 11. Herron, 858 F.2d at 336.
66. Foval, 841 F.2d at 130.
67. Id The Foval court added, however, that Rule 11 should not be ap-
plied to conduct that occurred in state court prior to removal. Id Ultimately,
the court remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the imposition
of sanctions in light of Thomas, 836 F.2d 866. Foval, 841 F.2d at 130.
68. For a general discussion of this proposed new standard, see infra
notes 128-61 and accompanying text.
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II. THE DESIRABILITY OF IMPOSING A
CONTINUING OBLIGATION
In fashioning a consistent approach to the removal issue,
several factors indicate that the imposition of a continuing obli-
gation best comports with the purposes behind the 1983 amend-
ments to Rule 11. These factors include the language and
purpose of the rule,69 the inability of other sanctions to perform
the same functions as Rule 11,70 the achievement of judicial
economy and prevention of litigant harassment,7 1 and the possi-
bility of permitting a plaintiff to amend the pleadings upon re-
moval in order to avoid Rule 11 sanctions.7 2
A. SATISFYING THE UNDERLYING PURPOSE OF RULE 11
Although reliance on the "plain meaning" of the 1983
amendment to Rule 11 has a certain appeal due to its ease of
application,73 strict application of this plain meaning approach
in the removal context undermines the policies supporting the
1983 amendment.74 For example, in Dahnke v. Teamsters Local
695,75 the federal appellate court allowed a blatantly frivolous
claim to be litigated; although a reasonable inquiry would have
disclosed that the plaintiff had no basis for a legitimate claim,76
the Dahnke court nevertheless held that it could not impose
sanctions because the pleadings were originally filed in a state
agency where Rule 11 does not apply.77 Withholding sanctions
in such a frivolous case merely because the plaintiff originally
69. See inkfra notes 73-88.
70. See infra notes 89-110.
71. See infra notes 111-26 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. CIv. P.
11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983).
72. See infra notes 141-51 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
74. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97
F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983).
75. 906 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1990).
76. The court held that the plaintiff could not assert in good faith that an
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law was warranted because the
case law was clear with respect to the standard - "intentional misconduct" -
for a violation of a union's duty of fair representation. Id. at 1201. In fact, the
trial judge noted that "any reasonable person" should have known that the lo-
cal union did not breach its duty of fair representation or commit intentional
misconduct. Id.
77. Id. The court noted that the union's decision not to pursue Dahnke's
grievance was well within its discretion, but because the plaintiff had not filed
any frivolous pleadings in federal court, Rule 11 sanctions could not be im-
posed. If, however, the plaintiff had filed any frivolous pleadings in federal
court, the federal district court could impose sanctions. Id
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filed the complaint in state court defeats Rule l's underlying
purpose of eliminating spurious claims.
In addition, the advisory committee notes and underlying
purposes of the 1983 amendment indicate that the Supreme
Court intended the Rule to impose some type of an ongoing ob-
ligation.78 Although the rule focuses on the facts known at the
time of filing,79 it also requires an attorney to update the plead-
ings as new information arises or risk sanctions.80
An ongoing obligation is particularly critical for satisfying
the goals of Rule 11 when a case is removed from state to fed-
eral court. Absent a continuing duty standard, a court may not
be able to sanction an attorney or party for litigating a frivolous
claim if the only pleadings were filed in state court or in a state
administrative agency.8x The Sixth Circuit faced this potential
problem in Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co.8 2 In that case, the
plaintiff filed a meritless state court complaint and did not file
any papers after removal, despite a pending motion to dismiss.8
Invoking the continuing obligation standard, the court imposed
sanctions because the plaintiff failed to conduct a reasonable in-
78. As stated by the advisory committee, the function of the amended rule
is to "discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litiga-
tion process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses." FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advi-
sory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983).
79. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97
F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983).
80. See Note, Duty to Withdraw, supra note 10, at 717. This standard still
focuses on the attorney's knowledge at the time the additional information be-
comes available, but prevents an attorney from avoiding responsibility for an
outdated pleading. Id.; see also Schwarzer I, supra note 10, at 200 ("A position
that might be reasonable in a paper filed early in the action may become un-
reasonable or frivolous in the light of subsequent discovery."). Another com-
mentator suggests that the certification requirement imposes a continuing
duty. See Nelken, supra note 5, at 1331. Nelken suggests that this continuing
obligation "properly requires the parties to use information gained in discov-
ery to refine and narrow the issues and claims on which they intend to go for-
ward. In addition, it discourages the use of litigation to coerce settlement for
purely economic reasons." Id
81. See, e.g., Schoenberger v. Oselka, 909 F.2d 1086, 1087 (7th Cir. 1990)
("federal rules do not govern practice in state courts"); Dahnke, 906 F.2d at
1199 (emphasizing that "[there seems to be little question that federal courts
cannot impose Rule 11 sanctions on a party for actions taken in state court (or
in state administrative proceedings)"). The Dahnke court observed that "a
signer may not incur Rule 11 sanctions for actions he took in state proceedings
before federal jurisdiction was invoked." Id. at 1201. Without specific filings
in federal court advocating a frivolous position, courts may not impose sanc-
tions on an attorney. Id.
82. 858 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1988).
83. Id. at 333-34.
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RULE 11
quiry at the time federal jurisdiction was invoked.84 To rule
otherwise would increase the number of frivolous claims in fed-
eral court while simultaneously preventing these courts from
sanctioning the offending litigants8s
Adopting an ongoing obligation should not, however, deter
lawyers from accepting unconventional cases or novel claims.8 6
Rule 11 explicitly allows an attorney to pursue a good faith ex-
tension, modification, or reversal of existing law.8 7 Neverthe-
less, this broad latitude for attorneys should not permit clearly
baseless claims to be brought in federal court.8 8
84. Id. at 336.
85. See Note, Duty to Withdraw, supra note 10, at 719 (imposing an ongo-
ing duty will force parties to abandon claims that pretrial discovery shows to
be meritless, thereby fulfilling the goal of "streamlining" litigation); see also
Advo Sys., Inc. v. Walters, 110 F.RD. 426, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (stating that as
discovery proceeds and parties spend more time investigating the merits of a
case, they have less justification for pursuing a baseless claim than when the
litigation began); Nelken, supra note 5, at 1331 (emphasizing that courts
should impose a continuing obligation in order to force parties to use informa-
tion gained in discovery to focus the issues).
86. Some commentators have expressed fears that an overreaching Rule
11 could make it difficult for litigants with unusual cases to seek legal repre-
sentation due to attorney concerns about Rule 11 sanctions. See Note, Plausi-
ble Pleadings, supra note 10, at 649.
87. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. A continuing obligation
rule is also appropriate in those situations in which the plaintiff, with only
good intentions, decides that because a claim is questionable it should be
brought in state court. In such a situation, the plaintiff believes the claim is
valid under state laws and rules, but does not want to risk subjecting the claim
to Rule 11 scrutiny in federal court. Some argue that under these circum-
stances, the only motive a defendant has for removing the case is harassment,
using Rule 11 as the tool to carry out this inappropriate objective. Rule 11,
however, explicitly allows an attorney to pursue a good faith extension, modi-
fication, or reversal of existing law, and proper application of the rule should
not bar unconventional or novel claims that have some meritorious founda-
tion. The fact that the threat of sanctions for misuse may tend somewhat to
inhibit attorneys is not equivalent to chilling vigorous advocacy. See
Schwarzer I, supra note 10, at 184.
Despite the concern with minimizing frivolous claims, however, federal
courts should not use Rule 11 as a basis for screening cases. One commentator
has observed that courts should not interpret the advisory committee's refer-
ence to "streamlin[ing] the litigation" process as approval for using Rule 11 as
a tool for case management. See Schwarzer II, supra note 10, at 1019. This
case management goal is best accomplished through Federal Rule 16, which
was substantially amended at the same time as Rule 11. Id.
88. Rule 11 requires the signing attorney or party to certify that the
pleading has a "factual and legal basis and that it is not interposed for delay."
See Schwarzer I, supra note 10, at 184. A lawyer therefore may be called on to
explain the basis or purpose of a paper. "But vigorous advocacy is not contin-
gent on lawyers being free to pursue litigation tactics that they cannot justify
as legitimate." Id. If, upon removal or at any other time during the litigation,
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B. RECOGNIZING THE UNIQUE CONTRIBUTIONS OF RULE 11
The one-time obligation courts justify their unwillingness
to impose sanctions for any pleadings filed in state court in part
by pointing to the array of alternative sanctions available.8 9
These other mechanisms, including the inherent power of the
court 90 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927,91 lack the diversity, breadth, and
depth of Rule 11, thereby limiting their deterrent effect on the
bringing of meritless claims. 92 The unique construction of Rule
11 enables it to address issues that other measures do not
cover.
93
Sanctions under the inherent power of the court and 28
U.S.C. § 1927,9 unlike Rule 11, are limited to instances when a
party or an attorney has acted in bad faith.9 5 This restriction,
in turn, limits their applicability to the very small number of
cases in which a removing party can prove that the plaintiff or
plaintiff's attorney intentionally filed a "bad" claim.
Furthermore, courts rarely invoke the "inherent power of
the court."96 Because this power is not subject to legislative
a "good faith" standard cannot be met for the filing of a claim or papers, sanc-
tions should be imposed. See Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332, 335
(6th Cir. 1988); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
89. See, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 875 (5th Cir.
1988) (en banc) (providing for regulation of discovery papers under Rule 26(g),
affidavits accompanying motions for summary judgment under Rule 56(g), and
persistent prosecution of a meritless claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1927); Gaiardo v.
Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483-84 (3d Cir. 1987) (addressing the "American
rule" and 28 U.S.C. § 1927); Hamer v. County of Lake, 819 F.2d 1362, 1370 n.15
(7th Cir. 1987) (defining the "inherent power" of the courts and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 146 (1989); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265,
1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and its prohibition against dila-
tory litigation practices), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987).
90. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
92. See Note, Duty to Withdraw, supra note 10, at 709-10. The article
demonstrates that although judges have the power to sanction post-filing con-
duct, the resulting decisions lack uniformity and consistency. Examination of
the alternative mechanisms demonstrates that Rule 11 provides the best vehi-
cle for deterring frivolous suits. Id.
93. See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. For cases describing
these alternatives, see Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 875-76
(5th Cir. 1988) (en banc); In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 448 (7th Cir. 1985).
95. See Note, Duty to Withdraw, supra note 10, at 710-12; see also Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975); F.D. Rich
Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974); Brown-
ing Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1087-88 (2d Cir.
1977) (all discussing sanctions under the inherent power of the court).
96. This power has been utilized "only in exceptional cases." See United
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oversight, the Supreme Court defined it narrowly, thereby lim-
iting its effectiveness as a deterrent to abusive litigation.
97
Likewise, section 1927 of Title 28 has similar limitations as a
substitute for Rule 11 in the removal situation. Section 1927
sanctions are permissive; Rule 11 sanctions, however, are
mandatory.98 Facing only the possibility of discretionary sanc-
tions for a bad faith claim, a risk-taking plaintiff with a poten-
tially frivolous claim may weigh the risks of potential sanctions
against the benefits of a successful suit and decide to file in
state court to avoid Rule 11,99 knowing that the defendant
likely will remove the case to federal court.10° Though a gam-
ble, if the plaintiff can safely assume that the defendant will re-
move the case, the benefits of possibly succeeding on the claim
may well outweigh the risks of originating the claim in state
court. Applying Rule 11 immediately upon removal, however,
would obviate such litigatory chicanery and support the goal of
eliminating frivolous claims.
Additionally, section 1927 does not impose sanctions until a
frivolous action "unreasonably and vexatiously" increases the
time and cost of litigation.101 This amorphous standard is both
States v. Standard Oil Co., 603 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting 6 J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 54.77, at 1709-10 (2d ed. 1972)); see also Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980); C. ELLINGTON, A STUDY OF
SANCTIONS FOR DIsCOvERY ABUSE 102-03 (1979); Note, The Dynamics of Rule
11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation by Demanding Professional Responsibil-
ity, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 300, 310-11 (1986).
97. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980); see also
Note, Duty to Withdraw, supra note 10, at 710-11.
98. The provision of mandatory sanctions also has been the aspect of Rule
11 that distinguishes it from the other available remedies and establishes it as
a unique vehicle for streamlining the litigation process. Even the Fifth Cir-
cuit, which advocates the one-time obligation viewpoint, has noted that the
mandatory language of the new Rule 11 does not afford district courts the dis-
cretion to conclude that sanctions are unwarranted and to deny them.
Thomas, 836 F.2d at 876. In contrast, under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's
inherent powers, the court enjoys such discretion. I&i; see also supra note 44
and accompanying text (noting that § 1927 applies only when the attorney acts
in subjective bad faith).
99. See Dahnke v. Teamsters Local 695, 906 F.2d 1192, 1199 (7th Cir. 1990)
('There seems to be little question that federal courts cannot impose Rule 11
sanctions on a party for actions taken in state court.").
100. For a similar argument, see Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d
332 (6th Cir. 1988). As the Herron court pointed out, the plaintiff might calcu-
late that the circumstances favor the defendant motioning to remove the case
to federal court. Id. at 336. The plaintiff nevertheless still may file in state
court in order to avoid federal Rule 11 sanctions. In the end, plaintiffs could
invoke federal jurisdiction without complying with the reasonable pre-filing
inquiry of federal Rule 11. Id.
101. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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difficult to prove and to apply consistently, a problem that fur-
ther minimi es the efficacy of section 1927. Finally, because
section 1927 only provides for cost-shifting, including excess
costs, expenses, and attorney fees "reasonably incurred because
of such conduct,"'10 2 it may not deter plaintiffs from filing frivo-
lous suits where such costs are likely to be low and the poten-
tial benefits of winning are great. Thus, the inherent
limitations of section 1927 and other judicial tools for limiting
the filing of frivolous claims and other papers supports the ap-
plication of Rule 11 to all parties in the removal context as a
more likely deterrent to meritless claims. 10 3
State courts likewise are unable to adequately sanction par-
ties for violations in the removal context. Although some
states have amended their civil procedure rules to match the
objective basis of Federal Rule 11,104 other states either have no
equivalent sanction rules or have retained the subjective stan-
dard of pre-1983 Federal Rule 11.105 Consequently, most states
apply a more lenient standard than the objective federal Rule
11, and state court review under this reduced standard is not
equivalent to federal court review of the claims. 106
102. Id.
103. In addition to monetary sanctions, courts may impose warnings, repri-
mands in open court, or written admonitions. See Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835
F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1987). One court ordered the attorneys who violated the
rule to circulate the sanction opinion to other members of their law firm. See
Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 129 (N.D. Cal.
1984), rev'd on other grounds, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
104. A survey of other jurisdictions adopting a standard similar to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 can be found in Note, Divining an Approach, supra
note 10, at 705 n.19 (1987). These state statutes include: ARIZ. R. CIv. P. 11(a);
CoLO. R. Crv. P. 11; DEL. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 11; D.C. SuPER. CT. Civ. R 11;
IDAHO R. CIv. P. 11(a)(1); IOWA R. CIV. P. 80; KY. R. CIv. P. 11; ME. R. CIv. P.
11; MICH. CT. R. 2.114(E); MINN. R. CIV. P. 11; MISs. R. CIV. P. 11(b); MONT. I
Crv. P. 11; NEv. R. Civ. P. 11; N.D. R. Crv. P. 11; S.D. R.P. Cm. CT. 15-6-11(b);
VT. R. CIv. P. 11; WASH. SUPER. CT. R. 11; Wyo. R. Crv. P. § 1-14-128. Another
commentator has suggested that Wis. STAT. ANN. § 814.025 (West. Supp. 1985)
adopts a similar standard. See Oliphant, supra note 4, at 739 n.45.
105. Because many states have no rule analogous to Rule 11, or have a rule
that imposes a much less stringent standard, defendants would have an incen-
tive to remove actions to federal court to obtain the benefits of Rule 11. See
Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 1987).
106. In a removal case, state courts rarely review pleadings under their
equivalent, if any, of Rule 11. For one reason, defendants must file motions
for removal within 30 days, see 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (Supp. 1990), and courts
rarely review the pleadings within this narrow window of opportunity. Also,
at the moment the defendant files the removal petition, state court proceed-
ings are stayed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (Supp. 1990). Furthermore, a defend-
ant may waive the right to remove by taking some substantial defensive action
in the state court before petitioning for removal, see Texas Wool & Mohair
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Furthermore, the process of removal' 0 7 deprives state
courts of the opportunity to impose sanctions under state rules
prior to removal. Under the removal statute, after the defend-
ant files a removal petition with the federal district court, the
state courts cannot take any additional action "unless and until
the case is remanded."'108 Thus, state courts cannot review
pleadings once the removal petition has been filed. Further,
federal courts may be unable to reach back to state court plead-
ings.'09 As a result, plaintiffs could be insulated from any fed-
eral court sanctions throughout the entire litigation if they
refrain from filing any additional pleadings in federal court." 0
Mktg. Ass'n v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 175 F.2d 835, 838 (5th Cir. 1949),
and courts, by themselves, rarely will impose sanctions prior to dismissing an
action. See generally Dyer, supra note 10, at 412 (1989) (noting that Rule 11
and summary judgment Rule 56 authorize different standards for similar eval-
uations and arguing that the standards should be the same).
In contrast, however, at least one court has held that when a defendant is
precluded from recovering Rule 11 sanctions in federal court because the suit
had been improperly removed, the defendant still may receive state law sanc-
tions. See In re Summers, 863 F.2d 20, 22 (6th Cir. 1988). Although it is theo-
retically possible, therefore, to apply state sanction rules after the defendant
attempts to remove, few cases are likely to arise with this factual scenario of
improper removal.
107. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
108. Id. In addition, the procedure for removal is set out in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446. Part (d) of the statute provides as follows:
Promptly after the filing of such petition for the removal of a civil ac-
tion and bond the defendant or defendants shall give written notice
thereof to all adverse parties and shall file a copy of the petition with
the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal and the
State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is
remanded.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (Supp. 1990). For a general discussion of removal jurisdic-
tion and procedure, see 14A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE § 3731 (2d ed. 1985).
109. See Dahnke v. Teamsters Local 695, 906 F.2d 1192, 1199 (7th Cir. 1990)
(emphasizing that federal courts cannot impose sanctions for actions taken in
state court); Schoenberger v. Oselka, 909 F.2d 1086, 1087 (7th Cir. 1990) ("fed-
eral rules do not govern practice in state courts"). The continuing obligation
courts assert, however, that federal standards should apply immediately upon
removal. See Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332, 336 (6th Cir. 1988).
110. Note, however, that if plaintiffs oppose a motion to dismiss or a mo-
tion for summary judgment, or even if they move to remand the case, these
filings would be subject to Federal Rule 11. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp.,
915 F.2d 965, 966-67 (5th Cir. 1990) cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 2824 (1991). In ad-
dition, in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990), the Supreme
Court held that Rule 11 jurisdiction is not dependent on subject matter juris-
diction because the imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the
merits, but rather is a collateral issue. IL at 2456. Other circuits have fol-
lowed the notion that a district court must possess the authority to impose
sanctions irrespective of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Willy, 915 F.2d
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Adopting a continuing obligation, therefore, becomes critical in
maintaining the federal courts' power to sanction such abuses
of the removal process.
C. PREVENTING LrITGANT HARASSMENT
The debate between the one-time and continuing obligation
theories also centers around fears of litigant harassment and
related notions of judicial economy. The important distinction
between the one-time and continuing obligation positions is
that the former courts assume that defendants will remove
cases for the purpose of securing Rule 11 sanctions,l u while the
latter courts believe that plaintiffs will initiate federal actions
in state court for the sole purpose of skirting Rule 11.12
The Fourth Circuit, a one-time obligation court, theorized
that defendants will use the threat of Rule 11 sanctions to har-
ass plaintiffs." 3 The statutory provisions related to removal,
however, define the circumstances under which a defendant
may remove a case to federal court, necessarily limiting a de-
fendant's ability to remove for specified permissible reasons." 4
Further, Rule 11 specifically applies to the defendant's motion
for removal, placing additional guarantees that a defendant will
not be able to remove a case to federal court for the sole pur-
pose of harassing the plaintiff with threats of Rule 11 sanc-
tions. 115  Finally, although defendants generally retain
discretion on whether to initiate removal of a state claim to fed-
eral court, such a move should not surprise plaintiffs. Plain-
tiffs' counsel are aware of the conditions that merit removal,
at 967; Wojan v. General Motors Corp., 851 F.2d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 1988); Or-
ange Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Frontline Ventures, Ltd., 792 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir.
1986).
111. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. The Kirby court be-
lieved that defendants would seek to take advantage of the sanctions and
would remove an action solely for that purpose. Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage
Corp., 811 F.2d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 1987).
112. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text. The Herron court be-
lieved that plaintiffs would initiate an action in state court, knowing that de-
fendants would remove it to federal court. However, under the one-time
obligation theory, courts could not impose sanctions because the only pleading
would be in state court. Herron, 858 F.2d at 336.
113. See Kirby, 811 F.2d at 257.
114. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (Supp. 1990); 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (Supp. 1990). These
sections detail the substance and procedure for removing a case from state to
federal court.
115. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (Supp. 1990) (specifically providing that a no-
tice of removal is "signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure").
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including federal question and diversity jurisdiction,116 and they
should evaluate the merits of their claims and their trial tactics
accordingly.117 Removal of a state claim to federal court, when
permitted, ensures that the defendant will have an opportunity
to litigate the claim in a fair and impartial forum, a guarantee
that provides an unlikely opportunity and motive for
harassment." 8
The one-time obligation theory also undermines Rule l1's
goal of judicial economy." 9 The advisory committee noted that
Rule 11 is designed to reduce spurious claims, discourage abu-
sive tactics, and streamline the litigation process in the federal
courts. °2 0 Allowing plaintiffs and their counsel to use trial tac-
tics to gain federal court jurisdiction without the spectre of
Rule 11 sanctions only adds to, rather than reduces, the
number of frivolous claims in federal court.' 12 A continuing ob-
116. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (Supp. 1990). This statute defines the types of ac-
tions that are removable. The two basic types of removable cases are those in-
volving a federal question or diversity of citizenship. Id
117. Application of an ongoing Rule 11 duty would force plaintiffs' attor-
neys to consider Rule 11 requirements during pre-filing strategy to determine
whether to file a removable claim in state court. Plaintiffs' attorneys should
know the factors necessary to remove a claim to federal court as well as the
risks involved in filing a claim that may be removed to federal court. Fur-
thermore, a plaintiff's attorney also can predict, or at least hypothesize, when
a defendant will remove a state claim to federal court. It appears to be a spe-
cious claim that a plaintiff could be truly "surprised" by removal. As the Her-
ron court observed, plaintiffs know or should know when a case could be
removed to federal court. Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332, 336 (6th
Cir. 1988). Forcing attorneys to consider Rule 11 in filing any claim also fur-
thers Rule l1's goal of filtering out frivolous claims and thereby enhancing ju-
dicial economy.
118. Critics of the ongoing obligation position ignore the purpose of al-
lowing a defendant to remove a state claim filed in a state court or agency.
Removal gives a defendant a more fair and impartial forum in which to con-
duct certain types of litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (Supp. 1990). Absent an
ongoing obligation, defendants who remove actions to federal court would be
denied the protections of Rule 11 and could face the prospect of fighting off
frivolous claims without providing the hope of recovery under Rule 11. An
ongoing obligation thus promotes the policies underlying the removal process
as well as clearing the federal docket of some frivolous claims, thereby stream-
lining the judicial process.
119. Rule 11 was promulgated to deter the flow of frivolous claims into fed-
eral court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97
F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
120. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D.
165, 198 (1983).
121. See Herron, 858 F.2d at 336 (allowing plaintiffs to continue to litigate a
frivolous claim in federal court after removal would undercut the purposes of
Rule 11). Similarly, an ongoing obligation prevents a plaintiff from continuing
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ligation, in contrast, would enable federal courts to eliminate
meritless claims from court dockets, thereby reducing defense
expenditures and use of court time while streamlining
litigation.1 22
In only one instance does the one-time obligation theory
enhance rather than hinder judicial economy - when the
plaintiff brings two related causes of action in a state court, and
the defendant removes, for example, the second claim to fed-
eral court only to obtain Rule 11 sanctions, but leaves the first
claim in state court.123 Under these facts, the defendant creates
an unnecessary second suit.1' 4 Bifurcating an essentially uni-
tary claim strains judicial resources, and some commentators
argue that the defendant should not reap the benefits of Rule
11 sanctions for such dilatory tactics.12 Nevertheless, assuming
that the removal motion itself is not frivolous and does not sub-
ject the removing defendant to Rule 11 sanctions,12 6 denying
the defendant the benefits of Rule 11 sanctions in defending
against a meritless claim under a continuing obligation theory,
even if the defendant used the removal to gain the advantage of
Rule 11 sanctions, is unfair. Defendants should not have to
choose between removing to federal court and having no Rule
11 protections or allowing the claim to stay in state court, in a
a case in order to coerce a defendant into a settlement and fulfills the Rule's
interest in expeditious resolution. See Nelken, supra note 5, at 1331.
122. See Note, Duty to Withdraw, supra note 10, at 719 & n.166. Continu-
ing obligation courts also could eliminate these specious claims at an early
stage of the litigation and would not be forced to wait for the first federal
court pleading before imposing sanctions. Id. at 722-23.
123. This situation could arise if one claim is wholly a state claim and the
other contains some federal elements. If the defendant removes the claim
containing some federal elements to federal court only to obtain Rule 11 sanc-
tions while retaining the valid state cause of action in state court, she creates
an unnecessary second suit. Similarly, if the plaintiff, as in Brown v. Capitol
Air, Inc., 797 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1986), brings an initial cause of action and at a
later time adds a second complaint as a separate action with a view to consoli-
dation, defendants conceivably could remove the second claim but leave the
first cause of action in state court. Id. at 107-08. In such an instance, even
though the plaintiffs may not have fulfilled the "reasonable inquiry" obliga-
tion of Rule 11, the federal district court maintains the discretion to withhold
sanctions if it views the defendants as having needlessly created a second suit.
1d at 108.
124. See id.
125. See ic The court emphasized, however, that defendants who remove
actions generally are protected by the provisions of Rule 11; only in the unique
circumstances of the particular case where removal effectively bifurcated what
should have been a single proceeding was the withholding of Rule 11 sanctions
justified. Id.
126. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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forum that may be unfair or inconvenient. Therefore, in order
to further Rule 11's goals of enhancing judicial economy and re-
ducing litigant harassment while preserving judicial fairness to
both the plaintiff and defendant, federal courts should adopt a
continuing obligation theory that also addresses plaintiff's con-
cerns regarding harassment through removal.127
IlI. IMPOSING A CONTINUING OBLIGATION IN
REMOVAL CASES UNDER RULE 11 -
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
A. REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPOSING A FAIR AND REASONABLE
ONGOING OBLIGATION STANDARD
If a defendant challenges the merits of a suit removed to
federal court on the basis of Rule 11, federal courts should ap-
ply a three-step approach to determine whether the suit de-
serves consideration. This process will help prevent the
litigation of frivolous claims yet effectively will create a balance
between the rights of defendants to remove cases from state to
federal court against the rights of plaintiffs to be free from un-
just harassment. When a suit is challenged upon removal,
courts should require the following steps: (1) the plaintiff and
plaintiff's attorney must reevaluate the pleadings;28 (2) the
court or challenging party must bring pleading deficiencies to
the attention of the pleader, who then must modify them to
conform to Rule 11, dismiss the claim, or face sanctions; 2 9 and
(3) the trial judge must maintain discretion to impose or with-
hold sanctions based on the exigencies of a particular case. 3 0
127. Finally, the recognition of a continuing obligation would be consistent
with the inherent power of the courts. The advisory committee's note empha-
sized that Rule 11 expands upon the courts' inherent power. FED. R. Civ. P. 11
advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983). The inher-
ent power doctrine requires parties and attorneys to refrain from dilatory
practices throughout the course of the litigation, and the advisory committee's
reference to it indicates that Rule 11 similarly should impose a continuing obli-
gation. See id.; Note, Duty to Withdraw, supra note 10, at 718. Thus, the
courts must adopt an ongoing obligation in order to comply with the purposes
behind the 1983 amendment and keep frivolous claims out of federal court.
128. See infra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 141-51 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 152-61 and accompanying text; FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advi-
sory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 200 (1983).
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B. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ONGOING OBLIGATION PRINCIPLE
1. Ongoing Obligation for Removal Cases
An ongoing obligation requirement best satisfies the goals
that the drafters of the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 established
and maintains the integrity of the legal process.13 1 The Advi-
sory Committee emphasized that the Supreme Court promul-
gated the new Rule 11 in order to accomplish two primary goals
- to discourage both the plaintiff's and defendant's abusive lit-
igation tactics while streamlining the judicial process. 132 The
ongoing obligation position best fulfills these dual purposes,
particularly in the removal context. Removal provides a better
forum - federal courts are better-suited to interpret federal
law or provide a neutral forum for interpreting state law be-
tween citizens of different states - in which to litigate certain
suits.13' An ongoing obligation also provides fairness to both
litigants.'- 4 A defendant who successfully removes a case to
the federal forum should have the full benefit of its rules and
procedures immediately upon removal,'3 and forcing the plain-
tiff to consider Rule 11 in filing a claim furthers the goal of fil-
tering out frivolous claims before they are filed, thereby
131. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. Civ. P.
11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983) (stating
that courts should pay increased attention to abuses in order to streamline the
litigation process).
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D.
165, 198 (1983). The advisory committee noted that Rule 11 was designed to
discourage dilatory tactics while streamlining the litigation process, and the
Supreme Court amended Rule 11 in 1983 to accomplish these objectives.
133. Note, however, that defendants can only remove a state-filed claim
that is based at least in part on federal law or diversity of citizenship. See 28
U.S.C. § 1441 (Supp. 1990); see also supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
134. See Note, Duty to Withdraw, supra note 10, at 707. As this Note dis-
cusses, because courts already require defendants to mitigate, "fairness seems
to require that they also impose on proponents of claims an affirmative duty to
prevent damage in the form of a continuing obligation to withdraw a claim if it
becomes baseless." 1Id. at 706-07.
135. Continuing obligation courts interpret Rule 81(c) to indicate that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to any action at the instant that
federal jurisdiction is invoked. At least one court has recognized that the Fed-
eral Rules should apply to the entire proceedings of a federal claim initiated in
state court that is subsequently removed to federal court, see Cannon v. Kro-
ger Co., 832 F.2d 303, 305-06 (4th Cir. 1987), and the Sixth Circuit has explicitly
stated that Rule 11 applies at the instant federal jurisdiction is invoked, see
Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332, 335 (6th Cir. 1988). Therefore,
Rule 11 should apply immediately upon removal in order to facilitate uniform-
ity throughout the court system and provide a common standard between state
and federal courts.
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streamlining the litigation process in federal courts.'3
To further meet the goals of enhancing judicial economy
and preventing litigant harassment, however, federal courts
should apply the proposed three-part process outlined above.
Circuits that adhere to the ongoing obligation theory already
apply the first step.1 3 7 These courts find that Rule 11 requires a
plaintiff and plaintiff's attorney to reevaluate the pleadings
upon removal.13 8 This one step is not, however, enough to sat-
isfy Rule l1's goals in the removal context.1 3 9 Thus, federal
courts should also adopt the second and third steps in the pro-
posed process. This modified continuing obligation theory pro-
vides the most effective vehicle for accomplishing Rule l1's
dual objectives. 140
2. Opportunity to Amend Pleading or Dismiss the Case
Under the proposed three-step process, Rule 11 applies to a
case immediately upon removal. Unlike the ongoing obligation
procedure that the majority of continuing obligation courts cur-
rently employ, however, the proposed compromise ongoing ob-
ligation standard would not allow immediate imposition of Rule
11 sanctions on a plaintiff for pleadings that fail to satisfy Fed-
eral Rule 11. Instead, upon removal to a federal district court,
if a defendant raises Rule 11 problems and the court rules for
the defendant on this issue, the defendant or the court must no-
tify the plaintiff that the pleadings are deficient. The courts
then must instruct the plaintiff as to what parts of the plead-
136. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
137. See Herron, 858 F.2d at 336 (upon removal, the litigant and the liti-
gant's attorney face an ongoing obligation to "conduct a reasonable inquiry
into the pleaded facts and law of the action to satisfy the requirements" of
Rule 11); Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 861 F.2d 746, 758 (1st Cir.
1988) (the "new Rule 11 imposes a duty on counsel to investigate their clients'
claims before making any filings and to reassess them throughout the
litigation").
138. Id.
139. The additional steps are necessary in order to place a burden on de-
fendants as well as on plaintiffs to minimize the number and duration of frivo-
lous cases in federal court. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
Under the current continuing obligation theory, plaintiffs conceivably could
face sanctions immediately upon removal; instead, under the proposed process,
plaintiffs would be able to amend the pleadings to make them non-frivolous or
else could dismiss the case, thereby minimizing federal court time spent on
baseless claims. See infra notes 141-51 and accompanying text. The trial court
would retain the ultimate discretion to tailor appropriate sanctions so as to
prevent either party from using Rule 11 as a tool for harassment. See infra
notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 141-61 and accompanying text.
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ings lack proper justification. The plaintiff would have an op-
portunity to modify the pleadings either to satisfy the court, to
withdraw the pleading, or to face sanctions.141 Although the
Supreme Court ruled that a voluntary dismissal of a claim filed
initially in federal court does not insulate a plaintiff from Rule
11 sanctions,142 voluntary dismissal without sanctions should be
permissible in the removal context. In the removal situation,
plaintiff files in state court under the state's pleading and sanc-
tions rules. Upon removal, the continuing obligation theory as-
serts that federal rules control.143 Consequently, the plaintiff's
complaint may not meet federal standards, and the federal
courts should permit immediate dismissal without the threat of
sanctions. If, however, the plaintiff delays in voluntarily dis-
missing the claim, the federal district court should impose sanc-
tions.144 Nevertheless, permitting plaintiffs to voluntarily
dismiss claims that do not meet federal standards saves signifi-
cant court time and results in a just and equitable result for all
parties involved.145
This step helps to balance the goals and concerns of the
one-time and continuing obligation positions. The plaintiffs
may amend complaints that the federal courts find frivolous,
141. See Foval v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 841 F.2d 126, 130 (5th Cir.
1988) ("Rule 11 should not countenance sanctions for pleadings filed in state
court in a case later removed to federal court unless, their deficiency having
been promptly brought to the attention of the pleader after removal, he (or
she) refuses to modify them to conform with Rule 11."). To hold otherwise
would defeat the letter and spirit of amended Rule 11. See also Herron, 858
F.2d at 336 (stating that the absence of a continuing obligation "would under-
cut the full force intended by Rule 11").
142. In Cooter & Cell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990), the
Supreme Court held that plaintiff's voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a) does
not deprive the district court of the ability to impose sanctions. Id. at 2455.
"Rule 41(a) permits a plaintiff to dismiss an action without prejudice only
when he files a notice of dismissal before the defendant files an answer or mo-
tion for summary judgment and only if the plaintiff has not previously dis-
missed an action 'based on or including the same claim."' Id. The Court
derived support for its position by noting that the "'violation of Rule 11 is
complete when the paper is filed'" and, therefore, a voluntary dismissal does
not eliminate the power of the court to impose Rule 11 sanctions. Id. (quoting
Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988)).
143. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Herron, 858 F.2d 332. In that case, the plaintiff orally agreed
to dismiss the case but failed to do so for several months. Id. at 333-34. The
district court imposed sanctions for this egregious conduct and for the time
and expense the court and opposing counsel endured, id. at 334, and the Sixth
Circuit affirmed, id. at 335-37.
145. See supra notes 66-67, 141 and accompanying text.
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using court instructions that specify which parts of the com-
plaint do not meet Rule 11 standards.146 If the plaintiff cannot
properly amend the complaint, withdrawal without penalty is
permitted, satisfying the one-time proponents' fear that defend-
ants will use removal solely for harassment.147 This process
permits the defendant only one motive for raising a Rule 11
claim: accurate and substantiated pleadings.-4s The federal
court would impose sanctions only when the plaintiff, after a
warning, is unable to provide valid pleadings and fails to with-
draw the complaint.14 9 Proponents of the continuing obligation
theory likewise would be satisfiedsa because only meritorious
146. Placing the burden on the moving party to demonstrate which plead-
ings are frivolous forces the moving party to specifically identify the basis for a
Rule 11 motion. This prevents courts from applying such sanctions indiscrimi-
nately. See, e.g., Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
("the burden specifically to articulate which submissions are defective and
why does provide some check against the unwarranted exercise of the trial
court's sanction powers") (emphasis in original); F.H. Krear & Co. v. Nineteen
Named Trustees, 810 F.2d 1250, 1268 (2d Cir. 1987).
147. See, e.g., Foval v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 841 F.2d 126, 130 (5th
Cir. 1988) (discussing the fact that the federal court should not impose sanc-
tions unless "their deficiency having been promptly brought to the attention of
the pleader after removal, he (or she) refuses to modify them to conform to
Rule 11").
148. Note that defendant's removal petition also is subject to Rule 11 sanc-
tions. Section 1446 of Title 28 provides that the defendant must sign a notice
of removal "pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 28
U.S.C. § 1446(a) (Supp. 1990).
149. In Herron, the court noted that the plaintiff failed to execute court-
ordered documents, and the trial judge delayed ruling on the motion for attor-
neys' fees for more than five months while waiting for plaintiff's response.
Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332, 333-34 (6th Cir. 1988). Because the
plaintiff's complaint was neither anchored in fact nor law, and because the
plaintiff ignored the requests of the court and counsel to comply with Rule 11
requirements, sanctions indeed were justified. I& at 337.
In addition, Rule 11 explicitly provides that its sanctions apply to "[e]very
pleading, motion, and other paper." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1990). Thus, any spe-
cifically identified paper, including a motion by the defendant asking for Rule
11 sanctions against the plaintiff, would itself be subject to Rule 11. See Hilton
Hotels Corp., 899 F.2d at 43-45; F.H. Krear & Co., 810 F.2d at 1268. As the
courts have noted, in some instances there may be very little practical differ-
ence between requiring an attorney to dismiss a suit or forcing that attorney to
continue the suit without any additional filings. See Hilton Hotels Corp., 899
F.2d at 45.
150. Thus, this standard effectively would prevent either side from abusing
the court system. The defendant is protected because the plaintiff would lose
any incentive to file every questionable paper initially in state court in an ef-
fort to avoid Rule 11 sanctions. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
The plaintiff therefore would have to satisfy the reasonable inquiry require-
ment of Rule 11 and could not continue an action in federal court until he
modified the pleadings to conform with Rule 11. See Herron, 858 F.2d at 335-
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claims would proceed to full trial.151
3. Trial Court Discretion
Finally, the trial court judge should retain limited discre-
tion to tailor or withhold Rule 11 sanctions depending on the
circumstances of a particular case.152 Although Rule 11 man-
dates sanctions whenever a violation is found, the federal dis-
trict court should determine what constitutes an appropriate
sanction.153 For purposes of Rule 11 in a removal case, an ap-
36. If the plaintiff failed to conform the pleadings to Rule 11 standards, the
court could impose sanctions if the reasonable inquiry standard were not met.
I at 336.
151. Although all parties would have invested time and money to reach
this stage, the court and defendant at least would both be spared the expendi-
ture of even greater amounts of time and resources required to fully litigate
frivolous claims. The ever-increasing costs of federal court litigation demand
that an attorney conduct a searching inquiry into the facts and law throughout
a lawsuit. A 1985 study indicated that a single hour spent by a federal judge in
a case costs the taxpayer up to $600, and the recent explosion of federal court
cases has undoubtedly escalated this estimate. See Levin & Colliers, Contain-
ing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 219, 226-27 (1985). Multiplying
this $600 per hour cost by the hours spent on frivolous claims can create a se-
vere financial drain upon the court system and the taxpayers. The cost to the
public of failing to do so should not be ignored. See Advo Sys., Inc. v. Walters,
110 F.R.D. 426, 433 (E.D. Mich. 1986). In Walters, the court discounted the
sanction by one-half since the parties were unaware of such a possibility of po-
tential sanctions. Nevertheless, the court explicitly gave notice to future liti-
gants that such costs could be passed on to them for frivolous claims instead of
being passed on to the taxpayers. Id
152. Commentators and courts alike have noted that district courts main-
tain the authority to make the final calculation as to the extent of reasonable
expenses within the context of Rule 11. This discretion enables judges to tai-
lor sanctions that will achieve the necessary balance among Rule 11's goals of
deterrence, punishment, and compensation. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs.,
Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 876-78 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (discussing the discretion the
district court possesses in tailoring sanctions). Judge Schwarzer added to this
analysis by emphasizing the following.
Permitting or encouraging the opposing party to litigate a baseless ac-
tion or defense past the point at which it could have been disposed of
tends to perpetuate the waste and delay which the rule is intended to
eliminate. It also undermines the mitigation principle which should
apply in the imposition of sanctions, limiting recovery to those ex-
penses and fees that were reasonably necessary to resist the offending
paper.
Schwarzer I, supra note 10, at 198. The courts should focus not on what the
parties are doing to each other, but on whether the lawyers are abusing the
legal process. See Schwarzer II, supra note 10, at 1024-25. By doing so, Rule 11
enforcement will move from private compensation to serving the larger inter-
est of the judicial process. Id
153. The rule expressly provides that attorney fees and reasonable ex-
penses are appropriate sanctions, but the court possesses the ultimate author-
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propriate sanction may be no sanction at all in some limited cir-
cumstances.lm For example, where a plaintiff files a state
court action that contains two separate causes of action, only
one of which the defendant removes to federal court, the fed-
eral district court may determine that the defendant effectively
harassed the plaintiff by unnecessarily bifurcating the litiga-
tion. 5 5 In such a case, the federal district court may withhold
sanctions on the claim - even if the claim would have been
subject to Rule 11 sanctions had the plaintiff originally filed it
in federal court 1 ss Similarly, both one-time and continuing ob-
ity to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of a case. FED. R. CIV. P. 11
advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 200 (1983). A commen-
tator noted the following- "Once a violation of Rule 11 has been found, sanc-
tions are mandatory. Judges, however, have broad discretion in choosing the
appropriate penalty." Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under Amended Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 499, 500-01
(1986). The discretion that the rule's drafters gave district courts in determin-
ing sanctions suggests that the drafters intended judicial discretion to operate
as a "safety valve" to reduce the pressure of mandatory sanctions. Thomas,
836 F.2d at 877. What is "appropriate" may be a warm, friendly discussion on
the record, a hard-nosed reprimand in open court, compulsory legal education,
monetary sanctions, or other measures appropriate to the circumstances.
Whatever the ultimate sanction imposed, the district court should utilize the
sanction that furthers the purposes of Rule 11 and is the least severe sanction
adequate to such purpose. Id at 877-78.
In addition, the courts must be restrained from using Rule 11 as a panacea
for all litigation abuses or use it as a docket-clearing mechanism. See
Schwarzer I1, supra note 10, at 1019. As the distinction between dealing with
the merits of litigation and dealing with lawyer misconduct is obscured, a risk
arises that courts will do neither effectively. Id. The proper role of Rule 11,
however, is not to provide fee-shifting, it is to deter litigation abuse. See An-
schutz Petroleum Mktg. Corp. v. E.W. Saybolt & Co., 112 F.R.D. 355, 357
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), quoted in Schwarzer H, supra note 10, at 1020 n.29.
154. Because the amended Rule 11 makes sanctions mandatory, some revi-
sion of the Rule might be necessary to accommodate this limited exception.
This exception could say, for example: "In the case of removal, the district
court may withhold sanctions if the plaintiff immediately and voluntarily dis-
misses a frivolous claim." Discussion of a specific provision to deal with such
exceptions, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
Nevertheless, the discretionary power of the trial court to withhold or tai-
lor sanctions to meet the particular facts of a case should be narrowly con-
strued to prevent inconsistency among courts in imposing sanctions.
Unlimited discretion may lead to discriminatory application of sanctions,
which amended Rule 11 is designed to eradicate. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advi-
sory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 199-200 (1983).
155. See Brown v. Capitol Air, Inc., 797 F.2d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1986).
156. As a practical matter, however, this exception is quite narrow due to
the nature of the removal statute and the infrequency with which defendants
are likely to remove only a single claim of a multi-claim case to federal court.
Under the removal statute, § 1441(c) provides that when a removable claim is
combined with an otherwise non-removable claim, the federal district court
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ligation circuits have held that a voluntary dismissal following
removal insulates a plaintiff from sanctions. 57
These limited exceptions to the mandatory sanctions of
Rule 11 are consistent with its goal of minimizing federal court
time on baseless claims.158 Bifurcating litigation increases the
costs for all parties, and even though removal of such cases may
be technically proper, defendants should not profit from this
trial tactic.159 In addition, this limited discretion to withhold or
to narrowly tailor sanctions so as to protect plaintiffs from un-
may remove the entire case to the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (Supp.
1990). Similarly, the district court may remand all matters not within its origi-
nal jurisdiction. Id Most of these cases will be handled in a single proceeding.
Furthermore, the defendant's removal petition is subject to Rule 11, and if the
defendant fails to satisfy Rule ll's standards in seeking removal, the district
court may sanction the defendant for a frivolous removal. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(a) (Supp. 1990). Thus, in most instances, federal courts either will dis-
pose of the claim in a single proceeding or impose sanctions on defendants for
frivolous removal petitions.
157. The Fifth Circuit, which supports the one-time obligation position,
adopted the notion that plaintiffs should not be sanctioned upon removal un-
less they fail to correct any pleading deficiencies enumerated by the district
court. See Foval v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 841 F.2d 126, 130 (5th Cir.
1988). Likewise, the Sixth Circuit, which supports the continuing obligation
position, noted that sanctions only could be imposed if the plaintiff "took some
action after the case was removed to federal court to further prolong the liti-
gation." In re Summers, 863 F.2d 20, 22 (6th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original).
In the Summers case, the plaintiff filed a voluntary dismissal immediately af-
ter the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. Id. at 21. For a contrary holding
regarding voluntary dismissal when all action, including the initial complaint,
is filed in federal court, see supra note 142 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
159. See Brown, 797 F.2d at 108. Although exercise of such discretion in a
bifurcated case may keep a claim that does not satisfy Rule 11 on the federal
docket, cases falling into this category are likely to be few in number and,
therefore, they will not significantly crowd the docket. In addition, placing
some discretion in the hands of the trial judge also may encourage mitigation
of fees and expenses. See, e.g., Schwarzer I, supra note 10, at 202. Schwarzer
noted that an obligation to mitigate is implicit in the rule and has been recog-
nized by the courts. The court may "take into account whether the same re-
sult could have been accomplished more expeditiously and whether the
charges appear disproportionate, keeping in mind, however, the rule's penal
and deterrent purpose." Id The court's power to reduce sanction awards pro-
vides an incentive for the claiming party to bring a potential Rule 11 violation
to the opponent's attention as soon as possible. Prompt notice of Rule 11 viola-
tions conserves judicial time, energy, and resources while simultaneously de-
terring future violations. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866,
879 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc). "In assessing the damage done, the court should
consider the extent to which it is self-inflicted due to the failure to miti-
gate.... The rule's purpose would be frustrated if it encouraged the offended
party to play the very game at which it is aimed." Schwarzer I, supra note 10,
at 200-01.
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due harm will alleviate the concerns that the one-time obliga-
tion courts raise about harassment. 60 Similarly, a plaintiff's
voluntary dismissal upon removal results in immediate elimina-
tion of a frivolous claim from the federal courts, thereby
achieving Rule ll's ultimate goal.' 61
CONCLUSION
The 1983 amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure increased judicial efficiency and minimized
abusive litigation practices in the federal court system. The
new Rule 11 imposes a duty on attorneys to certify that they
conducted a reasonable inquiry and determined that any papers
filed with the court are well-grounded in fact, legally tenable,
and not interposed for any improper purpose. The drafters of
the 1983 amendment, however, did not speak about the issue of
whether this duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry is a one-time
or ongoing obligation, thereby raising the question of whether a
court may impose sanctions for an action removed from state to
federal court.
In defining a solution for this issue in the removal context,
the principles behind the 1983 amendment - to deter baseless
filings in district court and to streamline the administration
and procedure in the federal courts - should guide the courts.
A compromise between the ongoing and one-time Rule 11 obli-
gation standards, one that addresses the underlying concerns of
both positions, best accomplishes Rule 11's goals. When a de-
fendant removes a case to federal court and raises valid Rule 11
concerns, courts should impose Rule 11 sanctions only if the
plaintiff fails to amend the deficient pleading or refuses to
withdraw the frivolous claim. By applying this three-part test,
courts can enable Rule 11 to become a shield against, rather
than a source of, abuse against frivolous litigation in the re-
moval context.
Theodore C. Cadwell, Jr.
160. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
161. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97
F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983).
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